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Abstract
This paper investigates the focal actors and their
heterogeneity in blockchain splits. Disagreements in
blockchain communities often lead to splits in the
blockchain and the community. For example,
disagreements within the Bitcoin community on
increasing the block size led to the blockchain split and
creation of Bitcoin Cash. We build on actor-network
theory to investigate blockchain split as a translation
process, and employ case study methodology to
examine Bitcoin splits. We identify several human
actors, such as miners, developers, merchants, and
investors, as well as non-human actors including
ideologies, exchanges and computer programs
involved in Bitcoin splits. Our results show that actor
heterogeneity, that is, the complex constellation of
diverse actors, plays a key role in blockchain splits. We
further describe how the human and non-human
actors’ fluid moves into micro and macro positions in
the network affect the development of the split. We also
discuss the role of these actors and their engagement
in forming micro and macro agencies in blockchain
splits. Our study adds to the understanding of actor
behavior and network dynamics in decentralized
information systems such as blockchain and open
source software.

1. Introduction
Blockchain-based services are run in a peer-to-peer
network of computers without a central authority [39,
37]. A characteristic feature of blockchain is nodes or
miners who collectively validate and bundle batches of
transactions into blocks and add these blocks into a
chronological chain [37]. Instead of a central server,
the chain is stored and synchronized on each node in
the network [39]. Consequently, blockchain-based
services are not maintained by a central authority, but
by a community of miners and developers [37]. Thus,
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resolving disagreements within the community
represents a particular challenge.
The disagreements within blockchain communities
often lead to a technical event known as a fork, which
refers to the divergence of a blockchain into two or
more potential paths [26]. For example, Bitcoin Cash
(BCH) was created as a result of a successful fork from
Bitcoin (BTC) due to the disagreement among the
communities on increasing the block size. In a similar
vein, Ethereum was also forked to create two separate
crypto currencies: Ether (ETH) and Ethereum Classic
(ETC) after the system was hacked [7]. ArcadeCity, a
carpooling platform, much like Uber but without a
central authority, was forked to create Swarm City. In
essence, a blockchain split is a consequence of a fork,
which is in turn a consequence of critical incidents
such as performance issues, catastrophic bugs, and
cyber attacks [7].
Despite the increasing managerial interest in
applications of blockchain technologies alongside the
booming cryptocurrency market, academic research
focusing on blockchain forks is somewhat limited [6,
23]. While the prior literature has examined open
source software (OSS) forks [10, 26, 29, 30], we hold
that for two reasons the findings from those studies are
not directly applicable to the blockchain context. First,
the studies are atheoretical and thus of limited value in
developing theoretically generalizable insights.
Second, blockchain forks differ from OSS forks, as
executing a blockchain fork requires attracting miners
to ensure sufficient computing power in order to make
the forked blockchain viable. OSS forks can occur
simply when developers move to supporting a new
project. Understanding forks and their impact is critical
for the stakeholders of a blockchain business
ecosystem to accurately evaluate the potential risks and
benefits. From a theoretical standpoint, forks are
complex in nature, and often associated with
contradictory sociotechnical interactions such as
network attacks, community disagreements, and
market confusion and uncertainties. Thus, as a first
step towards understanding the forks, research is

Page 4595

necessary to investigate the actors involved in the
blockchain ecosystem.
As a result, this study investigates what are the
focal actors and how does their heterogeneity manifest
itself in blockchain splits? We build on Actor-Network
Theory (ANT) [3, 15] as the theoretical foundation of
the study, and use the literature on OSS forks and
community splits [10, 25, 29] as our point of departure.
We employ case study methodology [8, 38] and collect
data from online sources and in-depth semi-structured
interviews with Bitcoin community members, namely
miners, developers, and investors. Our study
contributes to the nascent IS literature on blockchain
[23] as well as the research on OSS forks [10, 25, 29],
providing a theoretically grounded empirical analysis
of the actors involved in blockchain forks.

2. Blockchain fork
A blockchain fork refers to a change of rules that
separates the blockchain into two or more potential
paths [26]. There are three kinds of blockchain fork,
namely, soft-fork, hard-fork, and user-activated softfork [32]. A soft-fork is a backward compatible
software upgrade that splits the blockchain
temporarily. During the soft-fork process, the original
chain accepts blocks from both non-upgraded and
upgraded nodes. The forked chain would contain
blocks only from upgraded nodes. The upgraded nodes
must reach a consensus and gain a certain percentage
of the network processing power within a time limit,
otherwise the soft-fork fails and the original chain

continues. If the consensus is reached, the new rules
are implemented in the network. All nodes need to
upgrade or will be mining unrecognized blocks.
Bitcoin’s BIP 66 (signature validation) and P2SH
(address formatting) are examples of soft-forks.
A hard-fork is not backward compatible and
permanently creates two separate blockchains. Both
chains run in parallel but with a different set of rules.
Hard-forks are executed to handle acute issues such as
increasing block size, serious network abuse, and theft.
For example, BCH was created as the result of a hardfork from Bitcoin to increase block size. ETH and ETC
were created from Ethereum as the result of a hardfork.
Finally, a user-activated soft-fork is the
controversial concept of upgrading a blockchain
without the support of those who provide the network
processing power. Instead of relying on achieving the
threshold power for the fork, the user-activated softfork relies on the economic majority of the ecosystem.
BIP 148 is an example of a user-activated soft-fork on
the Bitcoin network, which took place between
midnight 1 August 2017 and midnight 15 November
2017.
Blockchain forks are widely discussed in the news.
However, to date, there is little academic research on
blockchain forks [6]. As blockchain projects are open
source, we conducted a literature review on open
source project forks. A few prior studies focused on
forks in the OSS context. Table 1 summarizes these
studies.

Table 1. Summary of prior research on OSS forks
Study
Rastogi
&
Nagappan [29]
Gamalielsson
&
Lundell
[10]
Nyman et al.
[26]

Robles
&
GonzalezBrahona [30]
Viseur [34]

Research Method
Statistical analysis on 2217 projects
from GitHub
Data from LibreOffice community
after a fork from OpenOffice.org.
The data include log data and 12
interviews
Theoretical

Theory
None

In-depth analysis of 220 forks

None

26 forks in open source projects

None

None

None

The literature review presented in Table 1 drew two
interesting observations. First, most of the research on
OSS forks investigates the survival of the original and

Key Findings
One in every five projects observes a decline in the
sustainability of community participation after a fork
LibreOffice community sustainable and no sign of project
stagnation even 33 months after the fork. Perceived by its
community as supportive, diversified, and independent
Fork ensures the code remains open, and the code that
best serves the community lives on. The fork provides a
mechanism to safeguard against despotic decisions by the
project lead
Forks occur in every software domain. They have
become more frequent in recent years, and very few
merge with the original project
42% of forks were motivated by technical specialization.
In 54% of the cases studied, both the fork and original
projects survived

forked projects after the split. The survival and
community sustainability of the forked as well as
original projects is not self-evident. In some cases,
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both the fork and the original project survive and
secure community support. Second, most studies on
OSS forks lack the application of theory, which
inevitably limits the theoretical contribution. We argue
that the actors (and their network) involved in the
project are critical to the survival of the blockchain
project. Thus, research applying a solid theoretical
foundation to identify the actors and examine the
underlying network can significantly extend the current
understanding of why blockchains fork.
While the blockchain literature has started to
burgeon, there is little research theorizing on
blockchain evolution. Mostly, the extant literature is
based on a selected technology focus [39], or debating
the dark side of blockchain such as enabling
anonymous actors to cover their illegal trades [12]. Our
focus in this paper is to understand the different actors
and their contradictory roles in developing Bitcoin
forks, and their further contribution to the Bitcoin
evolution.

3. An Actor-Network perspective on
blockchain splits
We employ ANT [3, 5, 15] as the theoretical
foundation to study Bitcoin splits. ANT provides a
sociotechnical perspective [18] to analyze the complex
interactions between technology and human processes
[2, 20], which is pertinent in the context of Bitcoin.
ANT does not distinguish between human and nonhuman actors [17]. In fact, it places a higher emphasis
on non-human actors, enabling the investigation of the
role of technology, for instance [14]. Furthermore,
ANT does not distinguish between micro (individual)
and macro (group of individuals or organizational)
actors in advance [5, 19]. This allows researchers to
consider the sociotechnical collective as a single actor
or group of actors, depending on the level of analysis
[5].
The ANT literature describes how heterogeneous
networks are created by a number of actors that can be
human or non-human [5, 27]. An actor is defined as
“any element which bends space around itself, makes
other elements dependent upon itself and translates
their will into the language of its own” [5: p. 286].
Actors include, for example, both social and technical
elements, such as individuals, a group of individuals,
organizations, ideologies, methodologies, concepts,
hardware, software, and other technical artifacts or a
part of any of them [17].
Accordingly, any actor, whether an individual,
object, or organization, is equally important in creating
a network [17]. The fundamental goal of the ANT is to
explore how networks are built or assembled by the

actors to reach a certain objective [14]. ANT has been
widely applied in IS research to understand the
complex social interactions with IT as well as
processes associated with IT implementations [31].
Consequently, we apply ANT in the blockchain
domain to interpret the complex social processes
associated with Bitcoin forks.
We rely on a number of concepts that guide us in
interpreting the complex processes associated with
blockchain forks. As stated, ANT emphasizes the
network and assumes nothing lies outside of it. Thus,
each actor can be defined and understood only in
relation to other actors in the network [19]. This
implies any actor can be considered a sum of smaller
actors. For example, a computer is a complex system (a
network) containing many electronic elements (actors),
which are hidden from the user, who simply uses the
computer as a single object (actor). This simplification
is known as punctualization [4: p. 153], and allows a
researcher to understand a network at different levels
of complexity or granularity depending on the research
objective.
In this paper, we view and explain blockchain splits
as a translation process of ANT, one that creates “a
temporary social order, or movement from one order to
another, through changes in the alignment of interests
in a network” [31: p. 54]. There are four phases or
moments in translation, namely problematization,
interessement, enrollment, and mobilization [3]. In
problematization, the focal actor, that is the key actor
behind the process of gathering other actors’ support
for a change initiative, defines the problem, identifies
relevant actors, explains how the problem affects those
actors, and outlines strategies to address the problem.
The focal actor establishes itself as an obligatory
passage point (OPP) between the other actors and the
network to render itself “indispensable” [3]. OPP refers
to the process of forming a shared focus among the
relevant actors to successfully pursue the interest. The
second phase of translation is interessement, which
involves convincing other actors through negotiation to
have interest that is aligned with the focal actor.
Incentives can be given to the other actors so that they
pass through the OPP and align their interest with the
focal actor [31].
Successful interessement is followed by enrollment,
which involves defining the roles of each actor in the
transformed or newly created actor-network. As a part
of the enrollment process, the commitments of
enrollment can be recorded in a shared memory
through inscription. In general, “an inscription is the
result of the translation of one’s interest into material
form” [4]. It should be noted that enrollment is
temporary; betrayal by enrolled actors (failing to act as
promised), is a possibility. On the other hand, if actors
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enrolled in the network adequately represent the
masses, enrollment manifests as active support, and
mobilization occurs.

4. Methodology
We employed case study methodology [8, 38] to
investigate blockchain forks, adopting a single case
approach [21, 38] and focusing specifically on Bitcoin.
We chose Bitcoin because it was the first blockchainbased application, and has undergone a number of
forks since its introduction in 2009. These events have
attracted considerable attention on traditional as well as
social media, thereby enabling us to collect rich data
from several sources, including online discussions.
The single-case approach is suitable when the case
is particularly exemplary [38] and examined over time
[21]. Bitcoin can be considered an exemplary case
[38], since cryptocurrencies are an important
application of blockchain technology and Bitcoin is the
most valuable and widely used cryptocurrency.
Second, with respect to the longitudinal nature of the
phenomenon under investigation [21], a blockchain
essentially contains a record of past events, and
meticulously describing blockchain splits requires
examining the events preceding the split.
As is typical in case study research, the empirical
data were collected from multiple sources [38], in this
instance between November 2017 and June 2018. We
first extracted secondary data on Bitcoin forks from
coindesk.com, a cryptocurrency-focused online news
source, and from bitcointalk.com, a Bitcoin- and
cryptocurrency-focused discussion forum using the
search keyword “fork”. Thereafter, we conducted five
in-depth, semi-structured interviews among Bitcoin
community members, including developers, miners,
and investors, to understand the fork as a process from
different actors’ vantage points. The interviewees were
recruited using a snowball approach, and all were men.
The interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes, and all
authors were present at the interviews.
The data were analyzed in accordance with the
interpretative actor-network lens [9, 19]. This included
several rounds to make sense of the sociotechnical
mess [19] of actors’ obvious and hidden traces in the
collected data. The mess is problematic for the
researcher, as it makes it difficult to comb the data into
clear categories. As a part of the interpretive analysis,
we conducted several iterative sketches in

understanding the micro and macro actor constellations
and their motives.

5. Case description
Bitcoin was the first application developed on
blockchain technology [11]. Common belief is that
Bitcoin was invented by an unknown person or group
of persons under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto
[24]. The genesis block of Bitcoin emerged in January
2009.
Bitcoin was developed as a decentralized digital
currency to revolutionize the traditional intermediarybased financial industry. At this time, Bitcoin
continues to be developed and maintained as an open
source project by a community. Thus, the community
members decide the stages of Bitcoin evolution.
However, the basic set of rules and functions allowed
in Bitcoin could not be changed without changing the
source code considerably.
In principal, blockchain-based applications such as
Bitcoin evolve by actor negotiation. A major change in
Bitcoin’s source code requires sufficient support from
the community. Such changes may lead to member
disagreement and trigger splits in the original network.
Once a split occurs, the two resulting blockchains
become incompatible with each other, and the one that
attracts enough community members survives.
Since Bitcoin’s inception in 2009, there have been
two coin splits, namely Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Gold,
although there have been several instances of major
changes (or hard forks) to the Bitcoin core client.
Notable changes include Bitcoin XT, Bitcoin
Unlimited, and Bitcoin classic. A timeline of the
Bitcoin hard forks is presented in Figure 1.
An update to the Bitcoin source code or protocol
requires that Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs)
are submitted by an individual or group of individuals
in the Bitcoin community (mostly developers). The
team maintaining the Bitcoin core reviews the proposal
with the community, and looks for general approval. If
the community signals approval, the update is pushed
to the next version of the Bitcoin core. Next, it is up to
the miners whether or not they run the updated client.
If they decide not to run it, the update fails. Thus, with
respect to Bitcoin, miners are very important members
of the community and play a key role in splits.
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Figure 2. Timeline of major events in Bitcoin history

6. Understanding Bitcoin splits through
the lens of ANT
According to ANT, all components of a network,
such as objects, ideas, processes, and any other
relevant factors, are considered as important as
humans in creating social situations [5, 18]. An actornetwork, i.e. assemblage [11], is a moving entity
whose articulations produce effects, leaving traces of
its passage in the form of rigid and fluid structures
and relationships [2, 14]. The choice of ANT as our
theoretical foundation has some specific assets in
terms of explaining how complex things change.
First, the focus is on the network and constant flux of
relations - instead of counting and categorizing of
end states or things – which helps us keep an eye on
the shifts of relations in the various contexts and the
diverse roles of players. For instance, categorizing
complex phenomena may lead to prematurely
ignoring significant aspects. Second, according to
ANT, the network [13] is all that exists; nothing
exists outside the network of relations, also known as
flat ontology. Consequently, even researchers, such
as the three authors of this paper, while trying to
understand Bitcoin forks are part of the network, as
we direct our intellectual inquiry to Bitcoin, which
could influence other actors. With the ANT lens, we
join the interpretive research tradition in qualitative
IS research [35, 36, 38].

6.1. Actors and the network
We identified eight types of focal actor in the
Bitcoin network that can influence a split: the
blockchain,
miners,
core
developers,
exchange/marketplace owners, investors, merchants,
hardware manufacturers, and wallets. These can be

micro level actors such as humans, technology
(including code scripts) or ideologies, and the diverse
interests of individuals; and at the macro level,
institutions, companies, banks, regulators, and tax
authorities, amongst others.
The first actor is Bitcoin blockchain, which
defines the set of rules through algorithms. The
algorithm also reflects the ideological foundations of
Bitcoin, such as decentralization, democracy and
anonymity.
Miners range from individuals with limited
computing power to large companies with
considerable computing power at their disposal.
Bitcoin mining is a competitive and risky endeavor.
Miners need to wait very long periods to confirm a
block and receive the reward for identifying the
block. To reduce revenue variance, miners join
mining pools and bundle together their computing
power. Revenues depend on the amount of work the
miner contributed to finding the block. As noted
earlier, miners are powerful and important actors in
the network, since the continuation of the blockchain
depends on them. Mining pools may have informal
voting mechanisms about which version of the coin
to mine.
Bitcoin core developers are those who develop
the Bitcoin source code. As Bitcoin is an open source
project, anyone with sufficient programming skills
can become a developer to contribute to the source
code. However, approval is needed to become a core
developer. As described earlier, updates to the
Bitcoin protocol are developed as BIPs, and
submitted for review to the approval community.
Thus, Bitcoin core developers are also powerful
actors in the network who can contribute to split.
Exchange/marketplace owners provide the
marketplace to connect Bitcoin buyers and sellers.
They are also important actors that may trigger splits
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indirectly. The marketplaces make it easy to buy and
sell Bitcoin in real money. They may play an
important role in a split by supporting and including
the forked coin in their marketplace. Such
information can be used to promote the newly created
coin among investors. If the exchange supports a
split, the traders generally receive an equivalent
amount of new coin (known as “air drop”) after the
split. If the split is not supported, customers are not
awarded the new coin.
Investors, particularly large institutional investors,
are also important in split decisions, as they can
manipulate the price of Bitcoin.
Merchants are those who adopt Bitcoin as a
payment method in their business. They typically
need a fast and secure payment system or want to
differentiate themselves from competitors by
providing the option to pay with Bitcoin. While
Bitcoin may be seen as a secure payment method, it
is often slow due to scalability issues. Thus,
merchants may not adopt Bitcoin as a payment
method, which may in turn trigger a split in Bitcoin to
make it faster.
Mining hardware manufacturers produce the
specialized hardware to mine Bitcoin. At the
beginning, CPU- based mining was possible for
Bitcoin. As time passed, the complexity of mining
algorithm increased and even GPU-based mining

become impossible. Today, specialized ASIC miners
are needed for mining due to high complexity.
Finally, a wallet is the software or app where
people keep their Bitcoins. Wallets include desktop
wallets, mobile wallets, and hardware wallets.
Wallets allow consumers pay Bitcoin for their
purchases. Thus, they play an important role in wider
adoption of Bitcoin.
Table 2. illustrates the various actors and their
heterogeneity from social, technological, and
economic dimensions in the Bitcoin community. For
example, from social dimension point of view,
miners can be individuals or even organizations and
they may become part of a mining pool and
collaborate with each other for mining. From
technological point of view, the miners need to own
computers, applications, cooling hardware, and
electricity for mining. Finally, from the economic
point of view, the miners want to earn money from
mining.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the actors
might play multiple roles in the network. For
example, an individual can be a developer, miner,
and investor. A mining hardware manufacturer
produces and sells the equipment but also acts as a
miner. These all reflect the heterogeneity of the
involved actors in the Bitcoin ecosystem.

Table 2. Illustration of heterogeneity of actors
Actor type
Blockchain
Miners

Bitcoin core
developers
Exchanges/
Marketplaces
Investors
Merchants
Hardware
manufacturer
Wallets

Identified heterogeneity of actor types
Social
Technology
Ideologies,
motivations, Algorithms, Internet, computing
collaboration, competition
power, electricity, storage space
Individual miners, mining pools, Computers, computer programs,
interactions and collaborations within electricity, cooling hardware, webcommunity
based applications
Individual developers, groups and Computers, programs, education
networks of developers, developer forums on the web
societies
Individual company, network of Technology for trading
companies
Individual investors, institutional Technology for trading
investors
Individual merchants, retailers, Technological
infrastructure
for
wholesalers
payment systems
Individual manufacturer, networks Mining
algorithms,
specialized
of manufacturers
hardware for mining (e.g., ASIC)
Consumers, merchants
Desktops, mobile devices including
software and hardware technology,
security

6.2. The fork as a translation process

Economic
Incentives
Money

Employment, asset
ownership
Information,
volume
Money

trading

Payment processing fees,
processing speed
Money, amount and price
of hardware sold
Revenue model

First, we describe problematization in the Bitcoin
case. Bitcoin suffers from a scalability problem due
to its wider adoption. In short, as the currency grows,
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so does the number of transactions. Thus, the onemegabyte block size limit became a bottleneck, with
transactions waiting a long time for confirmation.
During the worst periods of these performance issues
in January-February 2018, the average transaction
processing times exceeded 10,000 minutes1,
obviously limiting the currency’s commercial use.
As Bitcoin is open-source, anyone can put
forward proposals for improvement. For example, in
order to solve the scalability issue, two possible (and
opposing) paths were identified. Bitcoin coredevelopers were the focal actors for the first path, and
their proposal was to allow some data to be moved
outside of the main network, creating multiple
ledgers or side chains. This is known as Segregated
Witness (SegWit). Some miners viewed activating
SegWit without increasing the block size would not
help and is just a temporary solution to the scalability
problem. Although many developers were against
increasing the block size, a significant portion of the
Bitcoin community decided to increase the block size
to two megabyte (this is known as SegWit2x). This
can be seen as enrollment in the ANT terminology.
However, SegWit2x ultimately failed to find
consensus among the community and core
developers. This reflects what ANT refers to as
betrayal.
Another competing solution was simply to
increase block size to accommodate more
transactions per block. The focal actors were
Bitmain, an ASIC Bitcoin mining hardware
manufacturer, and its mining pool. They established
themselves as the OPP by promising mining support
(interessement). Thus, some developers also took
interest in the option (enrollment). In addition, this
group of the community believed that SegWit2x
might eventually fail or at least would not be
executed in the near future. Thus, the community
decided to split and make the new coin, BCH (i.e.,
mobilization occurred).
The Bitcoin gold split unfolded in a different way.
While BCH was created to tackle Bitcoin’s
scalability problem, Bitcoin Gold aimed to mitigate
the increasing centralization of the Bitcoin mining
industry. As described earlier, Bitcoin mining has
become increasingly processor-heavy, and custombuilt ASICs are a popular solution. Bitcoin mining
became an industry, where the leading companies
accounted for a huge amount of network processing
power. As shown in Table 3, just a few big mining
players hold the majority of that power. Thus, a
1

(https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-confirmation-time,
accessed on 15 June, 2018 at GMT 13:24)

developer team became the focal actor and
introduced an alternative mining algorithm
(equihash), which is suitable for GPUs, and they
claimed that creating Bitcoin gold made mining
democratic again.
Table 3. Computing power distribution among
mining pools
Mining pool
BTC.Com
AntPool
SlushPool
ViaBTC
Unknown
BTCTOP
F2Pool
BTCC Pool
BW.com
BitFury
BitClub Network
58COIN
GBMiners
Bitcoin.com
KanoPool
ConnectBTC
BitcoinRussia
Total

Computing
power %
26.7
12.9
12.0
11.7
9.0
8.4
7.2
3.1
2.2
1.5
1.5
1.2
1.0
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.2
100.0

Progressive
%	
  
26.7	
  
39.6	
  
51.6	
  
63.3	
  
72.3	
  
80.7	
  
87.9	
  
91.1	
  
93.3	
  
94.8	
  
96.3	
  
97.5	
  
98.5	
  
99.2	
  
99.5	
  
99.7	
  
99.9	
  
~100	
  

Source: https://blockchain.info/pools, accessed on June 15, 2018
at GMT 13:00

7.1. Key findings
We highlight three main findings from the study. The
first relates to actor heterogeneity. We found that
each actor type includes heterogeneous features,
which could be classified into three broad categories:
social, technological, and economic. Our findings
show the Bitcoin actor-network comprises key nonhuman actors such as the blockchain itself and
wallets. Other non-human actors, such as technology
(e.g. code, algorithm, electricity), as well as
institutions (regulators, central banks, global financial
system) and ideologies (e.g. an inclusive and
democratic global payment system) influence the
split process as embedded in the focal actors.
Our second key finding focuses on the role of
actor heterogeneity, particularly related to the
translation process. We observed that many of the
actors involved in the process could have both a
micro and macro nature. For example, a miner can be
an individual (micro actor) as well as a mining pool
(macro actor). We also observed there is a constant
flux between micro and macro positions, as
individual miners aggregate their resources and form
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mining pools. Furthermore, certain mining companies
have become heavily involved in hardware
manufacturing. By moving into a macro actor
position they can exert considerable power in the
network. Altogether, Bitcoin mining has become an
oligopolistic market, dominated by a small number of
large mining companies. As a result, miners without
ASIC technology and/or affordable electricity at their
disposal have largely abandoned Bitcoin.
The third key finding relates to the dynamic
nature of the non-human actors, as ideologies may
contribute to a blockchain split. For example, one
interviewed miner reported he had engaged in mining
primarily due to intellectual curiosity in the
technology, but had lost much of his interest due to
the shift to ASIC mining. Similarly, a blockchain
entrepreneur said the hype around Bitcoin has had a
profound influence on the community dynamics, as
economic interests and incentives have overridden
idealism.

7.2. Contributions
Our study extends the current literature in three
specific areas. First, in its principal area of
contribution, the study advances the understanding of
blockchain forks by elaborating on the actors
involved and their heterogeneity in a cryptocurrency
context. To this end, our results suggest the actors in
Bitcoin forks are considerably more heterogeneous
and their networks more complex than has been
reported in the prior literature on OSS forks [10, 25,
29]. We identified eight types of actor involved in
Bitcoin forks. We have further elaborated on their
behavior in micro and macro settings for negotiations
related to forking the blockchain. Moreover, our
findings highlight the fluidity of actors’ roles prior to,
during and after the blockchain split. We believe the
actor types that we found in this study are generic in
nature and thus are applicable for other
cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum. Furthermore, we
believe a similar approach can be followed to
investigate OSS forks to identify communalities and
differences with blockchain forks.
Second, pertaining to a more theoretical sphere,
the present study adds to the current ANT research
focusing on blockchain [6, 33, 37]. To this end, our
findings increase the understanding of the role and
constant fluid constellation of the blockchain
network, caused by actor heterogeneity. Moreover, in
analyzing their heterogeneity, we provide a finegrained account of the actors involved in blockchain
forks. As our specific contribution to the ANT
literature [6, 33], we have described how the micro
actors engage with, and even fuse with, other micro

and macro actors, and elaborated on the
consequences of these fusions. They are poorly
understood theoretically as well as in practice due to
their complex nature. For instance, rather than
considering blockchain as a single technology, ANT
provides specific assets to understand blockchain as a
network of heterogeneous agents with diverse ends.
Third, our findings advance the understanding of
cryptocurrencies as actor-networks. Our analysis
revealed the actor-network involved in Bitcoin forks
comprises not only human but also non-human actors
and interplay between the two. For example, the
constantly increasing algorithmic complexity in
Bitcoin mining requires significant amounts of
computing power and electricity. This has led to a
situation where institutional miners with significant
financial investment acquired the required computing
power and now dominate Bitcoin mining (see Table
3). This, in turn, fundamentally questions the open,
decentralized nature and ideology underlying Bitcoin.
In sum, the study contributes to the discussion on
the roles and interplay of human and non-human
elements of information systems [e.g. 1, 21, 31].
Furthermore, we ask to what extent agency could and
should be attributed to non-human actors [28], and
what are the potential consequences of non-human
agency. From a broader perspective, our study
contributes to growing the discussion on interplay
and power relations between technology and humans
[7, 16, 22].

7.3. Limitations and future research
The study has a number of limitations. First, the
empirical research focused solely on Bitcoin forks.
However, we hold that the actors and the nature of
their heterogeneity identified in Bitcoin, provide
meaningful insights into other cryptocurrencies (e.g.
Ethereum), where mining and miners play a key role.
Nevertheless, there are also cryptocurrencies such as
Ripple (XRP) that have been pre-mined by the
developer team. This implies the applicability of our
findings to other contexts and instances of blockchain
forks requires additional research. Thus, we suggest
future research could extend the scope of empirical
investigation to other instances of blockchain forks,
to specifically focus on investigating the potential
commonalities and differences between blockchains.
Second, our study comprises empirical data from
two online sources and five interviews. Yet, the aim
of the study was to address a new theoretical opening
in decentralized technologies, so obtaining additional
empirical data is essential to reinforce the
trustworthiness of the interpretations.
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Third, the choice of theoretical lens obviously has
a profound influence on the interpretations drawn
from the empirical data. For the present study, we
adopted specific elements of ANT as our theoretical
lens. In order to obtain different perspectives and
interpretations of blockchain forks, we suggest
additional research should scrutinize the advantages
and disadvantages of different theoretical lenses in
understanding blockchain splits.
.
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